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Property Law.  Yanku v. Walgreen Co., 224 A.3d 1130 (R.I. 2020).  
In Rhode Island, a commercial landlord owes a duty of care to their 
tenant’s invitees only in three narrow circumstances: (1) where the 
landlord beaches a repair provision of the lease; (2) where the 
landlord is aware of a defect, but the tenant or guest is not; or (3) 
where the landlord voluntarily “assume[s] the duty to repair.”1  
Where no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the 
landlord owed a duty of care to the tenant’s invitees, and the 
plaintiff presented no evidence that the slip and fall resulted from 
unseen danger, a grant of summary judgment is proper.  Further, 
the failure to obtain a transcript of the summary judgment hearing 
where no written decision was issued by the trial justice will be 
fatal to any appeal.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On December 31, 2019, Esther Yanku, an eighty-three-year-old 
woman, sustained injuries after tripping “over a speed bump in the 
parking lot of a Walgreens Pharmacy” in Cranston.2  The plaintiff 
filed suit against the property tenant, Walgreen Company and 
Walgreen Eastern Company, and also the property owners and 
landlords, Jean Farmanian-Ricci and Joan Frattarelli.3  The 
plaintiff brought a “six-count complaint against the defendants, 
alleging two counts of negligence based on premises liability, one 
count of vicarious liability, one count of negligent training and 
supervision, one count of negligent hiring and retention, and one 
count of negligent failure to exercise ordinary care.”4   
The plaintiff alleged that she could not distinguish between the 
yellow parking space lines and the yellow lines on the speed bump, 
1. Yanku v. Walgreen Co., 224 A.3d 1130, 1133 (R.I. 2020) (quoting
Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 (R.I. 2013)). 
2. Id. at 1131.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1132.
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even though she had been there on numerous prior occasions.5  The 
plaintiff admitted that in her previous trips she “must have” 
discerned the speed bump.6  The defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was granted on October 20, 2018, along 
with a final judgment.7  The lower court determined that the 
plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the speed bump constituted 
a “hazardous condition . . . on the premises.”8   
On November 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.9  
The plaintiff alleged that the speed bump “is a per se inherently 
dangerous condition and can only constitute an open and obvious 
danger if it is properly designed, maintained, and marked with 
warning signs.”10  The plaintiff argued that the speed bump was 
“negligently constructed and maintained” because the paint color 
delineating the speed bump was the same as the paint color 
delineating the parking spots.11  She additionally alleged poor 
lighting in the parking lot.12  Lastly, the plaintiff insisted that 
whether the speed bump constituted a dangerous condition was a 
material fact of the issue “that should have been resolved by a jury 
rather than a trial justice.”13 
On appeal, the defendants argue that the lower court did not 
err because the plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the speed 
bump was an “unreasonable danger or that it was negligently 
constructed and maintained.”14  Additionally, the landlord 
defendants argued that their status as a commercial landlord 
precludes them from liability or duty of care to their tenant’s 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether the speed bump was an open and obvious 
danger or a dangerous condition on the premises.16  Conducting a 
de novo review of the grant of summary judgment, the Court had to 
determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact.17  
Classifying the granting of summary judgment as “an extreme 
remedy,” the Court acknowledged that summary judgment is 
appropriate absent genuine dispute.18   
Further, the Court determined that the plaintiff did not prove 
that the commercial landlord exceptions applied.19  The three 
limited circumstances where a commercial landlord maintains 
liability to their tenant’s invitees are where the “injury results from 
the landlord’s breach of covenant to repair in the lease, or from a 
latent defect known to the landlord but not known to the tenant or 
guest, or because the landlord subsequently has assumed the duty 
to repair.”20  Walgreens’ lease with the landlord specifically left the 
parking lot maintenance to Walgreens.21  The Court also found that 
the lease contract specified that the landlord is only responsible for 
the repair and maintenance of the “exterior and structural portions 
of the building and for the repairs caused either by fault of the 
landlord ‘or by fire, casualty or the elements, or by dry rot or 
termites.’”22   
Next, the Court determined that for the speed bump to 
constitute a latent defect the plaintiff must prove that the landlord 
knew or “should have known of an unsafe condition on their 
premises.”23  In the absence of evidence that the landlord was 
responsible for the parking lot, the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant was correct.24  Further, the plaintiff 
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1132–33.
18. Id. at 1133 (quoting Ballard v. SVF Found., 181 A.3d 27, 34 (R.I.
2018)). 
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 (R.I. 2013)).
21. Id. at 1133–34.
22. Id. at 1134.
23. Id. (quoting Bromaghim v. Furney, 808 A.2d 615, 617 (R.I. 2002)).
24. Id.
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was also unable to provide any evidence establishing that the injury 
resulted from “unseen danger.”25  To establish liability for a slip-
and-fall case, the plaintiff must produce “evidence of a dangerous 
condition” of which the landlord “was aware or should have been 
aware,” and that the dangerous “condition existed for a long enough 
[time] that the owner of the premises should have taken steps to 
correct the condition.”26  
Lastly, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff failed to produce 
the transcript from the summary judgment hearing as required by 
the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.27  The Court held 
that the failure to order the hearing transcript was “fatal” to the 
plaintiff’s appeal “because it is impossible to conduct a meaningful 
review of [the] case” where the trial justice issued no written 
decision.28  The Court found that the plaintiff’s claim was based on 
conjecture and speculation due to lack of evidence establishing the 
speed bump as a dangerous condition, and, as such, the grant of 
summary judgment was proper.29  
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court firmly acknowledged that to 
survive a summary judgment, a party must establish a genuine 
issue as to a material fact.  Merely alleging an accident on a premise 
will not establish premises liability.  Where a plaintiff offers no 
evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, summary 
judgment is appropriate.  The Court clarified that to establish 
premises liability in a slip-and-fall case, the plaintiff must prove 
that the injury resulted from “an unseen danger.”30   
The Court also reiterated the limited scenarios where a 
commercial landlord owes a duty to their tenant’s invitees.  The 
Court made clear that if one of these limited scenarios does not 
exist, a commercial landlord would not be liable to the tenant’s 
invitees.  The holding reiterates that under Rhode Island case law, 
a commercial landlord does not automatically owe a duty of care to 
25. Id. (quoting Voccola v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 209 A.3d 558,
561 (R.I. 2019)). 
26. Id. (quoting Voccola, 209 A.3d at 560–61).
27. Id.; see also R.I. SUP. CT. R. APP. P. 10(b)(1).
28. Id. at 1135.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1133 (quoting Voccola, 209 A.3d at 561).
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its tenant’s invitees.  Rather, according to the Court’s holding in 
this case, where a plaintiff alleges a latent defect, the plaintiff must 
show that the landlord knew or should have known of an “unseen 
danger” on the property.31  The Court’s analysis indicates that the 
facts in this case clearly did not call under one of the limited 
scenarios where a commercial landlord would be liable for the 
injuries of a tenant’s invitee. 
In addition, the Court explained that its task was made more 
difficult in this particular case because of the plaintiff’s failure to 
order the transcript from the hearing on the motions for summary 
judgment.  The Court pointed out that it has previously stated that 
“the deliberate decision to prosecute an appeal without providing 
the court with a transcript of the trial court proceedings is risky 
business.”32  In its holding, the Court reiterated that the failure to 
provide the transcript of the summary judgment hearing, absent a 
written decision by the lower court, is fatal to an appeal.  The Court 
noted that Rhode Island case law makes clear that “unless the 
appeal is limited to a challenge to rulings of law that appear 
sufficiently on the record and the party accepts the findings of the 
trial justice as correct, the appeal must fail.”33  The Court explained 
that where the plaintiff fails to order a transcript, it is impossible 
for the court to “conduct a meaningful review of the case.”34  The 
Court indicated that without the transcript its hands were 
essentially tied.   
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the lower court did 
not err in granting summary judgment because there was no 
genuine dispute as to the material facts of the case.  The Court held 
that the commercial landlord did not possess a duty of care to its  
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1134–35.
33. Id. at 1135 (quoting Mills v. C.H.I.L.D., Inc., 837 A.2d 714, 719 (R.I.
2003)). 
34. Id.
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tenant’s invitees absent an exception.  Further, the plaintiff’s 
failure to obtain the transcript of the summary judgment hearing 
was fatal to the appeal.  
 Jill Elizabeth Magnus 
